Abstract
Based on previous researches and the perspective of incomplete contract, this paper builds mathematical model of risk investment and financing contract mechanism design on control transfer and its incentive and restraint of two-stage risk financing. And impact on the mechanism design of risk financing contract of control right transfer and its incentive and restraint of two-stage risk financing are analyzed, which are venture entrepreneur's own fortune, nonmonetary private benefits of running a firm, on-the-job consumption level, social reputation, effort level, efforts type, own proportion of residual claims, exclusion and specificity of human capital, and investment amount of capital of venture capitalists, the investment specificity, risk aversion coefficient, benefits of strategic goal and monitoring cost, etc., and a series of conclusions are provided. Therefore, this study provides a useful adjustment and adding to the contract mechanism design theory of enterprise's risk financing.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1145-1152 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| State | Published - May 2014 |
Keywords
- Control right transfer
- Game model
- Incentive and restraint
- Incomplete contract
- Non-monetary income
- Risk financing