信用多重约束下供应链企业间动态古诺博弈的非线性演化研究

The research on the nonlinear dynamic evolution of Cournot duopoly game and its equilibrium state in the economic system has been paid much attention by the academic circles, while the multiple constraints of credit have become the key to the stable development of modern enterprises, and have an important impact on the game behavior and stability of enterprises. In view of this, this article considers the multiple constraints on credit such as downstream enterprises’ credit default, bank loan willingness and bank credit risk appetites, to build the upstream duopolies output decision dynamic Cournot duopoly model under the multiple credit constraints. Combining the nonlinear dynamic theory and Cournot game, the influence of multiple credit constraints on the equilibrium stability of two upstream duopolies’ dynamic output game and the evolution characteristics of Cournot-Nash equilibrium are analyzed systematically. Through theoretical derivation and simulation research, it is found that: 1) The increase of downstream enterprises’ credit default, bank loan willingness and the gap between bank credit risk appetites has a stabilizing effect on the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of output decision, and the degree of influence of the three decreases in turn; 2) The increase of the gap between bank credit risk appetites will result in the oligopoly under the chaotic state; 3) The increase of fluctuation frequency of downstream enterprises’ credit default and bank loan willingness can restrain chaotic behavior, but it is not conducive to the stability of Cournot-Nash equilibrium.