Research on incentives contract design and learning mechanism in risk investment

The incentives of control right transfer is an important element of the principal-agent incentives contracts, but the principal-agent incentives contract mechanism design under the dynamic learning mechanism still lack of in-depth study. Thus based on existing research, this paper considered the interaction between the project income risk and the professional managers' moral hazard, and integrated with the control right transfer incentives and the risk-averse behavior of professional managers. And based on those, this paper established the two-stage optimization and learning model of the principal-agent incentives contract including capital and labor input of professional managers of risk-aversion, and explored the learning mechanism and influential factors of venture investors, and found the interaction mechanism among the control right transfer incentives, the risk-averse professional managers' moral hazard behavior and the project income risk. The study found that the positive correlation between control right transfer incentives and project risk, and the scale compensation effect under the learning effects of risk investors. In addition, the study also found the significant enhanced effect of on-the-job consumption and the strategic benefits of risk project on the labor utility of professional managers of risk aversion through calculating the experiment, but the significant enhancement effect of the strategic benefits of risk project on the investment income of venture investors is sole. Integrating the control right transfer incentives, the risk-averse professional managers' moral risk and project income risk into the design of risk investment principalagent contract has stronger theory value, also have a certain reference significance for venture investors and professional managers.